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The Equivalent Circumstantial
Guarantees of Trustworthiness Standard
for Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24)
Jonathan E. Grant*
I. Introduction
The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay' as a statement,2
other than one made by the declarant3 while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Hearsay is not admissible in court except as provided by the com-
mon law in state courts and by the Federal Rules in the federal
courts.' The rule against relying on hearsay was an outgrowth of the
development of the jury system.5 Courts recognized the unreliability
or impropriety of using hearsay by persons not called.6 For a time,
this rule against hearsay was qualified by the notion that hearsay,
* B.S. Cum Laude, University of Maryland; M.A., Johns Hopkins University; J.D. The
American University, Washington College of Law; Member of New York and District of Co-
lumbia Bars.
I. FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
2. FED. R. EvID. 801(a). A "statement" is (I) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the declarant as an assertion.
3. FED. R. EvID. 801(b). A declarant is a person who makes a statement.
4. FED. R. EvID. 802.
5. In its earliest form, the jury functioned as a committee or special commission of
qualified persons in the neighborhood to report on facts or issues in dispute. C. MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 244-246 (3rd ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Mc-
CORMICK]. To the extent necessary, its members conducted informal investigations among
those who had special knowledge of the facts. Witnesses who could attest to writings were
summoned with the jurors and apparently participated in their deliberations, but the practice
of calling witnesses to appear in court and to testify publicly about the facts developed later.
Although systems similar to juries existed as early as the 1100's, the practice of hearing wit-
nesses in court remained an infrequent one until the later 1400's. Id. at 724-25. The gradual
emergence of in-court testimony of witnesses signalled a need for exclusionary rules of evi-
dence. Early witnesses could speak only of what they saw and heard, a requirement that would
naturally apply to the new class of testifying witnesses. However, a new problem arose when
the witness heard firsthand X's out-of-court statement that he saw and heard a blow with a
sword, or witnessed a trespass on land, as evidence of the blow or the trespass. The earlier
first-hand knowledge requirement may have contributed to the judicial skepticism on the value
of hearsay. Id. By the second decade following the Restoration, the notion received a fairly
constant enforcement, both in civil and criminal cases. While no precise date or ruling is deci-
sive, it appears that between 1675 and 1690 the fixing of the doctrine [against hearsay] oc-
curred. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1364 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
6. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, §§ 244-246.
while not independently admissible, could come in as confirmatory of
other evidence.7 This qualification survived to the end of the 1700's
in the limited form of admitting a witness's prior consistent out-of-
court statements to corroborate his testimony.8
As the jury system developed and the rules of evidence evolved,
it became clear that not all evidence classified as hearsay should be
excluded. Professor Wigmore maintains that the requisites of an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule are necessity and a circumstantial guar-
antee of trustworthiness. 9 The necessity requirement acknowledges
that, unless the hearsay statement is admitted, the facts it estab-
lishes may be lost, either because the person whose assertion is of-
fered may be dead or unavailable, or because the assertion is of such
a nature that one could not expect to obtain evidence of the same
value from the same person or from other sources.1"
Wigmore recognizes three circumstances under which hearsay is
trustworthy enough to serve as a practical substitute for the ordinary
test of cross-examination: first, when a sincere and accurate state-
ment would naturally be uttered and no plan of falsification would
be formed; second, when the danger of easy detection or fear of pun-
ishment would probably counteract the desire to falsify; and third,
when the statement was made under such conditions of publicity
that any errors would probably have been detected and corrected. 1
Most of the common law exceptions follow Wigmore's guide-
lines. The Federal Rules of Evidence 12 adopted many of the common
7. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 244 (3rd ed. 1984),
quoting 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1364 (rev. 1974).
8. Id.
9. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 1421, 1422 (3rd ed. 1959).
10. Id. at § 1421. According to Wigmore, "necessity" does not uniformly demand a
showing of total inaccessibility of firsthand evidence as a condition precedent to the acceptance
of a particular piece of hearsay. Necessity exists when great practical inconvenience would
otherwise be experienced in making the desired proof. Dallas County v. Commercial Union
Assurance Company, 286 F.2d 388, 396 (5th Cir. 1961) quoting 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§
1421, 1702 (3rd ed. 1959).
II. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §' 1422 (3rd ed. 1959).
12. Promulgated by the Supreme Court on November 30, 1972, the Federal Rules of
Evidence formed a major project of the 1959 United States Judicial Conference's rules-study
program. Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings before the Special Subcommittee of Reform
of Federal Criminal Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representa-
tives, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1973). The Supreme Court's rule-making authority dates back
to 1792, when Congress empowered the Court to prescribe the procedure in common law,
equity, and admiralty cases. I Stat. 276 (1792). The Act of August 23, 1842, in 5 Stat. 518
(1 842), reaffirmed this power. After the conformity Act of June 1, 1872 withdrew the Court's
statutory authority, the federal courts continued to either conform to state common law proce-
dure, or develop their own principles. 17 Stat. 197 (1872). In 1923, following a Voluntary
Committee Report on establishing a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the Law,
headed by the late Elihu Root, the American Law Institute (ALl) was organized. W. DRAPER
LEWIS, HISTORY OF THE PROPOSED AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE,
(1942). The ALl members argued that a Restatement of the Laws of Evidence was impracti-
cal because: I) reconciling conflicting case law would prove difficult; 2) since the existing law
was bad its restatement would not enhance the cause of justice; and 3) the existing rules of
law hearsay exceptions, including present sense impression;"3 excited
utterance; 14 then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition; 15
and statements for purposes of medical diagnoses or treatment.'6 In
Rule 803(24), the Federal Rules created a new exception, the so-
called "catchall" hearsay exception, which "allows in under certain
circumstances hearsay not covered by other exceptions.''
17
Rule 803(24) allows in evidence which might otherwise be ex-
cluded because of the unusual situations in which the out-of-court
statement was created.' 8 Thus, determining whether a statement
meets the equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is
not always a simple task. Courts have occasionally strayed from and
confused the traditional approach to evaluating whether hearsay is
trustworthy. This article will trace the development and application
of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24) and will examine the decisions
evidence were so defective that they operated to suppress the truth, rather than affording the
means to develop it. The ALI's Counsel thus recommended a thorough revision of the existing
law. Grant, The Trustworthiness Standard For the Public Records and Reports Hearsay Ex-
ception, 12 WESTERN STATE U. L. REV. 62 n.42 (1984).
13. FED. R. EvID. 803().
14. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
15. FED. R. EvID. 803(3).
16. FED. R. EvID. 803(4).
17. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) provides that:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but hav-
ing equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, [is admissible] if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative of the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may
not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to
the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer
the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.
Rule 803(24) was not originally included in the proposed Rules of Evidence, but various mem-
bers of both the judiciary and Congress saw a need to allow in hearsay evidence that could not
be classified under any specific exception. After a split between the House and the Senate,
Congress enacted a compromise hearsay exception to allow in statements not specifically cov-
ered by any of the other twenty-three exceptions. As part of the compromise, five requirements
must be met in order to admit the statement. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. One
requirement is that the statement have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.
Other hearsay exceptions include: 803(5) Recorded Recollection; 803(6) Records of regu-
larly conducted activity; 803(7) Absence of entry kept in accordance with provisions of para-
graph (6); 803(8) Public records and reports; 803(9) Records of vital statistics; 803(10) Ab-
sence of public record or entry; 803(11) Records of religious organizations; 803(12) Marriage,
baptismal and similar certificates; 803(13) Family records; 803(14) Records of documents af-
fecting an interest in property; 803(16) Statements in ancient documents; 803(17) Market
reports, commercial publications; 803(18) Learned treatises; 803(19) Reputation concerning
personal or family history; 803(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history;
803(21) Reputation as to character; 803(22) Judgment of previous conviction; and 803(23)
Judgment as to personal, family or general history.
18. The parallel hearsay exception to Rule 803(24) is Rule 804(B)(5). Unlike 803(24),
804(b)(5) can only be used when the out-of-court declarant is unavailable.
of these courts in light of 803(24)'s legislative purpose.
II. Background
The impetus for the residual hearsay exceptions 9 derived from
a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision."0 In Dallas County v.
Commercial Union Assurance Co.,2 1 a county in Alabama sought
recovery for the loss of a collapsed courthouse clock tower. The
county claimed that the clock tower collapsed five days after it was
struck by lightning, as evidenced by witnesses and charred timbers.
The insurer, denying liability, argued that the tower collapsed be-
cause of structural defects, and that the charred timbers resulted
from a fire which occurred during the tower's construction. The in-
surance company offered as evidence a fifty-eight-year-old newspa-
per article about the fire.22 Although the article failed to come
within any of the established exceptions to the hearsay rule the trial
judge admitted it into evidence .2  The jury found for the insurer.2 '
The introduction of the article and the decision of the court be-
low survived appeal.2 5 The court dismissed the plaintiff's argument
that "you cannot cross-examine a newspaper"2 and instead relied on
Wigmore's guidelines for determining hearsay exceptions by the
yardsticks of necessity and trustworthiness.2 7 The circumstances in
Dallas County met the necessity condition because the fire occurred
more than fifty years prior to the tower's collapse.28 Any person who
witnessed that fire with sufficient understanding to observe it and
describe it accurately would have been a young child at the time.
19. Sonenheim, The Residual Exceptions To The Federal Hearsay Rule: Two Excep-
tions In Search of A Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 868 (1982).
20. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
21. Id. at 390.
22. Id. at 390-91.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 398.
26. Id. at 391. This familiar argument misapprehends the origin and nature of the
hearsay rule. The rule is not an ancient principle of English law recognized at Runnymede,
and gone is its odor of sanctity. Id. n.l. The Dallas County court further stated that:
Wigmore is often quoted as stating 'cross-examination is beyond any doubt
the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the truth.' 5 Wigmore
§ 1367 (3rd ed. 1959). In over 1200 pages devoted to the hearsay rule, however,
he makes it very clear that '[tihe rule aims to insist on testing all statements by
cross examination, if they can be ...No one could defend a rule which pro-
nounced that all statements thus untested are worthless; for all historical truth is
based on uncross-examined assertions; and every day's experience of life gives
denial to such an exaggeration - and with profound verity - is that all testi-
monial assertions ought to be tested by cross examination, as the best attainable
measure; and it should not be burdened with the pedantic implication that they
must be rejected as worthless if the test is unavailable.'
I Wigmore § 8(c) cited at 286 F.2d at 391, nl.
27. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
28. Dallas County, 286 F.2d at 396.
Presumably, an eyewitness to an event fifty years in the past would
be either dead or incapable of testifying due to the dimming of fac-
ulties by the passage of time.29
The trustworthiness aspect further supports admitting the news-
paper article, primarily on the basis of common sense.30 As the Dal-
las County court reasoned, it is inconceivable that a small town
newspaper reporter would claim there had been a fire in the dome of
the new courthouse if no fire had occurred. The reporter is without
motive to falsify, and a false report would have subjected both the
newspaper and the reporter to embarrassment within the commu-
nity. Lack of memory, faulty narration, intent to influence the court
proceedings, and plain lack of truthfulness, the usual dangers inher-
ent in hearsay evidence, did not figure in this case. 31 Therefore, the
court held that the evidence was admissible because it was necessary
and trustworthy, relevant and material. Additionally, its admission
was within the trial judge's exercise of discretion in holding the hear-
ing within reasonable bounds.32
Against the background of this and similar cases, 33 the Prelimi-
nary Draft of the Proposed Rules of Evidence adopted a general pro-
vision allowing the admission of hearsay if there was an assurance of
accuracy.34 This was followed by a list of twenty-three examples,3 5
29. Id.
30. Id. at 397.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 398.
33. Dallas County was not the only decision allowing in hearsay under a "catchall"
hearsay exception. For example, United States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968),
held that, where the witness could not at trial identify the defendants, a police officer's testi-
mony that the witness had identified the defendants as the persons who had passed counterfeit
bills to her was admissible given the highly probative and reliable nature of the evidence, and
the trial court's instructions as to the weight to be given it. The court declared that:
[H]earsay should be admitted where, as here, there is no more satisfactory evi-
dence available, probative force is high, and availability of the hearsay declarant
for cross-examination makes the possibility of prejudice slight. The statement of
the barmaid identifying defendant was spontaneously made within a few mo-
ments of the time the bill was passed and while defendant was still in his place
at the bar. It is unlikely that her observation of the man who gave her the bill
was mistaken - he was awaiting her return with his change. There was no time
for lapse of memory. No reason for her to lie was suggested; in any event any
motive she might have had to falsify would not have been substantially different
at the trial than it was at the time of the event. The process of pointing out the
defendant was so simple that an error in communication was improbable. The
barmaid was unlikely to have remained silent if the police had collared an inno-
cent bystander rather than the man she intended to point out.
Id. at 412-13. Notably, this court also admitted the evidence on the strength of Wigmore's
guidelines, rather than on the basis of a specific rule. See also infra notes 64-65 and accompa-
nying text.
34. "(a) General Provisions. A statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if its
nature and the special circumstances under which it was made offer assurances of accuracy
not likely to be enhanced by calling the declarant as a witness even though he is available."
Committee of Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES Dis-
which are now the first twenty-three exceptions to Rule 803.6
Critics of this first draft feared that the "illustration" approach
would unduly minimize the predictability of rulings at trial, increase
the hazards of trial preparation, and give too great a measure of
discretion to the trial judge.3" Nevertheless, many conceded that
"some flexibility in judicial assessment must be allowed in order to
permit necessary growth of evidence law." 8
Two years later, the Advisory Committee revised the proposed
rules.39 The residual exceptions limited judicial discretion more than
the predecessor draft by allowing statements not specifically covered
by an articulated exception to the hearsay rule to be admitted if they
had "comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."4
While recognizing the dangers of unbridled judicial discretion and
the need for definite rules, the committee appreciated that trial
judges must have broad discretion. The new Rule 803(24) reflected
the understanding that 1) detailed rules cannot account for all con-
tingencies; 2) the hearsay rule had never been and never should be a
closed system; and 3) in certain cases, hearsay evidence not falling
within one of the exceptions may have greater probative value than
evidence which fits within an enumerated exception.41
When the United States Supreme Court submitted the revised
proposed Rules of Evidence to Congress on February 5, 1973,42 the
House and the Senate views on the catchall hearsay exceptions di-
verged. The House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, after balanc-
ing the need to provide for growth, development, and flexibility of
the hearsay rule against the fear of injecting too much uncertainty
into trial preparation,' 3 voted to delete both residual exceptions."
The Committee found that proposed Rule 10245 countenanced a suf-
TRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 46 F.R.D. 161, 345 (1969).
35. 4 J. WEINSTEIN AND M. BERGER. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 803-869 (1984) [herein-
after cited as WEINSTEIN].
36. See supra note 17.
37. WEINSTEIN, supra note 35, quoting Project of a Committee of New York Trial
Lawyers, RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY RELATING TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S PRELIMI-
NARY DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 69 (June 1, 1970).
38. Id.
39. REVISED DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS
AND MAGISTRATES, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
40. Id. at 422.
41. Yasser, Strangulating Hearsay: The Residual Exceptions To The Hearsay Rule,
II TEX. TECH. L. REV. 587 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Strangulating Hearsay].
42. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1973).
43. WEINSTEIN, supra note 35 at 372, citing Note, Erosion of the Hearsay Rule, 3 U.
RICH. L. REV. 89 (1968).
44. Id.
45. FED. R. EVID. 102 provides that "[tlhese rules shall be construed to secure fairness
in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delays, and promotion of growth
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined."
ficient grant of judicial discretion to innovate should the need arise."'
Additionally, the House Committee feared that the residual excep-
tions would inject an undesirable amount of uncertainty into the law
of evidence, thus impairing the practitioner's ability to predict trial
court rulings.4
7
The Senate Judiciary Committee did not believe that Rule 102
would provide sufficient flexibility for the courts to admit trustwor-
thy hearsay' 8 and feared that without the residual exception, trial
judges would be confronted with the necessity of rejecting reliable
and necessary evidence.' 9 Consequently, the Senate Committee de-
cided to reinstate a residual exception for rules 803 and 804.50 The
Senate Committee narrowed the scope of the residual exceptions5'
by requiring that Rule 803(24) have a trustworthiness standard
equivalent 2 to that of the previously enumerated exceptions, that the
statement be offered to prove a material fact, that the statement be
more probative on the point for which it is offered than other reason-
ably available evidence, and that its admission be consistent with the
other Rules and the interests of justice.53
The Rules were referred to a Senate House Conference Com-
mittee, which added a proviso requiring that the use of a statement
under the residual exception had to be preceeded by pre-trial ad-
vance notice of the offeror's intent to introduce the evidence.5 Con-
gress adopted the Conference Committee's version of the residual
hearsay exceptions and the rule became law.55
46. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93rd Cong., I Sess. 6 (1973).
47. Id. The House Committee speculated that lawyers would have little pre-trial cer-
tainty about what evidence might be offered and ultimately admitted under a requirement of
guarantees of trustworthiness comparable to the enumerated exceptions.
48. S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 19 (1974).
49. Strangulating Hearsay, supra note 41 at 591. The Senate Committee believed that
"there are certain exceptional circumstances where evidence is found by a court to have guar-
antees of trustworthiness equivalent to or exceeding the guarantees reflected by the presently
listed exceptions, and to have a high degree of probativeness and necessity could properly be
admissible." Id. quoting from S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 6 (1974).
50. S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974).
51. Id.
52. Id. The Senate Committee stated that "[aln overly broad residual hearsay excep-
tion could emasculate the hearsay rule and the recognized exceptions or vitiate the rationale
behind codification of the rules." Id.
53. The Senate Judiciary Committee cautioned that:
The committee does not intend to establish a broad license for trial judges to
admit hearsay statements that do not fall within one of the exceptions. The trial
judge will exercise no less care, reflection, and caution than the courts did under
the common law in establishing the now-recognized exceptions to the hearsay
rule.
S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974).
54. H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, 11-13 (1974).
55. Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
III. The Equivalent Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness
Criteria For Rule 803(24).
A. The Traditional Standard in Determining the Trustworthiness
of Hearsay
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24) is one of the few rules with
an explicit trustworthiness requirement. The text of its parallel rule,
804(B)(5), as well as Rules 803(6),56 803(7) 57 and 803(8),58 also
mention trustworthiness. Common law or legislative history easily
defines the trustworthiness standard in 803(6), 803(7), and 803(8).
However, the residual exceptions, particularly 803(24), are recent
statutory inventions, based in part on a few common law cases. Their
existence derives from a recognition that different or unusual factual
situations require a rule flexible enough to allow in otherwise inad-
missible evidence. This raises the issue of whether the trustworthi-
ness standard should be flexible. A statement admitted under
803(24) should have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness." While undefined by the Rule, the term "equivalent"
seems indicative of the Senate's desire to meet the critics' demands
for tighter standards. However, "equivalent" might also be read as
imposing a qualitative rather than a mechanical standard. If a state-
56. FED. R. EvID. 803(6) states: "The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule,
even though the declarant is available as a witness.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, reports,
records, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or
diagnoses made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a
person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum, reports, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testi-
mony of the custodian or other qualified witnesses unless the source of informa-
tion of the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthi-
ness. The term "business" as used in these paragraphs includes businesses,
institutions, associations, professions, occupations, and callings of every kind,
whether or not conducted for profit.
57. FED. R. EvID. 803(7) provides:
Absence of entry in records in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6).
Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or
data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions, of para-
graph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the mat-
ter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, records, or data compilation
was regularly made or preserved, unless the sources of information or other cir-
cumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
58. FED. R. EvID. 803(8) provides:
Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in
any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the
office or agency or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to
which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases
matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C)
in civil actions and proceedings and against the government in criminal cases,
factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate
lack of trustworthiness.
ment appears under the circumstances to be trustworthy, it should
make no difference that the factors leading to that conclusion differ
markedly from those underlying any or all of the specific exceptions.
The more traditional approach in judging the trustworthiness
standard for the admission of hearsay is to examine the credibility of
the extra-judicial declarant and not that of the witness. 9 The trier of
fact must be able to determine the extra-judicial declarant's credibil-
ity at the time he made the statement attributed to him. To accom-
plish this, the fact-finder must view the statement as part of the
other evidence in the case, 0 assessing such factors as the character
of the statement, the nature of the statement, whether written or
oral, the relationship of the parties, the probable motivation of the
declarant in making the statement, and the circumstances under
which it was made.6 For example, in the pre-Federal Rules case
United States v. Barbati,2 the court examined the circumstantial
trustworthiness of a witness at the time she identified two men who
gave her counterfeit currency. At trial she was unable to identify the
men. The court, however, allowed in the identification of the men
which she had provided to the police at the time of the incident.
Since there was no reason for her to lie, nor a likelihood that she was
mistaken when she identified the men, as there was no time for a
lapse of memory,63 the identification was held admissible.
59. WEINSTEIN, supra note 35, at 369.
60. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 333 (1961) quoted
in WEINSTEIN, supra note 35, at 370.
61. WEINSTEIN, supra note 35, at 370.
62. 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See also the discussion supra note 33.
63. Id. at 412. The court noted that:
The critical testimony of the barmaid was as follows: A ...they [the po-
lice] came and they asked me where I got the money, I showed them. Q. Did
you point out the two men? A. Yes, I did. Q. What if anything happened after
that? A. Well, they searched the men. Q. Did they search the two men that you
pointed out? A. Yes. Q. Do you see any of them here now? A. I can't remember
them. Q. You wouldn't remember what the men looked like now? A. No, it was
so long ago. Q. What if anything did you do with the $10 notes you got from
these men, after the police came? A. I was taken in the back with the money
and the police and I signed those notes at that time. Q. Those were the two notes
that were given to you in the bar by the two men? A. Yes. Q. What if anything
did the police do with the two men that you pointed out in your presence? A.
They put their hands on the walls ...and they searched them for weapons, I
guess and after that I don't know what happened to the two, I suppose they took
them away.
The policeman had no doubt that the defendant was the person identified in
the bar by the barmaid. The barmaid had no doubt that the man she pointed out
who was arrested was the person who gave her one of the notes. It is not dis-
puted that the person so identified was physically in police custody until after he
was fingerprinted. No one suggests that the person fingerprinted is not the defen-
dant who was tried in this case. The evidence was highly probative and reliable.
No more satisfactory proof was available. The apparatus for testing the credibil-
ity of these two key witnesses was available - the oath, cross-examination and
presence at the trial where the jury could observe demeanor.
Id. at 410.
In Huff v. White Motor Corporation,6 4 one of the principal is-
sues on appeal was the exclusion from evidence of the decedent's
hospital-bed statements concerning the cause and nature of the truck
fire which caused his injuries. 8 Reversing the lower court, the court
of appeals held that privity-based admissions should be tested for
admissibility under the residual exception provided for in Rules
803(24) and 804(B)(5) rather than under the admissions provision
of Rule 801(d)(2)."' The court found that the decedent's statements
met the 803(24) "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustwor-
thiness" standard.17 Therefore, the guarantees governing application
of the exception are those that existed when the statement was
made.8
The court noted that Huffs statement was an unambiguous and
explicit report of the events he had experienced two or three days
earlier; it contained neither opinion nor speculation.69 He was not
being interrogated, so there was no reason to give any explanation of
how the accident happened unless he wanted to do so. 70 There was
64. 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979). The Administratrix of an estate brought a wrongful
death action against a truck manufacturer on the theory that the fuel system's defective design
caused the fire which took the driver's life. Specifically, Huff, the deceased, was driving a
truck-tractor when it jackknifed, sideswiped a guard rail, and collided with an overpass sup-
port. Aside from the structural damage to the tractor, the fuel tank ruptured and caught fire,
engulfing the cab area. Huff's severe burns caused his death nine days later. The trial court
excluded defendant's offered testimony of Melvin Myles. Out of the presence of the jury,
Myles testified that, when he and a friend visited Huff in his hospital room two or three days
after the accident, Huff gave the following description of how the accident occurred:
[H]e told us first more or less what happened and this U.S. 41 there has a
bad curve there and he told us as he was approaching the curve or starting into
it his pant leg was on fire and he was trying to put his pant leg out and lost
control and hit the bridge abutment and then the truck was on fire.
Id. at 290.
65. The district court excluded this testimony as hearsay, rejecting defendant's argu-
ment that Huffs statement was an admission under Rule 801(d)(2), or admissible under the
residual exception, Rule 803(24), and Rule 804(b)(5). Id.
66. The court declared that:
Although neither the rules themselves nor the Advisory Committee Notes refer
to privity based [sic] admissions, and Congress added nothing on the subject in
its consideration of the rules, the language of Rule 801(d)(2) and the general
scheme of the hearsay article support our conclusion. Privity-based admissions
are within the definition of hearsay, Rule 801(c), an extra-judicial statement
offered "to prove the truth of the matter asserted," and are not among the spe-
cifically defined kinds of admissions that despite Rule 801(c) are declared to be
hearsay 801(d)(2).
Id.
67. Huff, 609 F.2d at 292. In contrast, the probative value of an admission of a party-
opponent, classified as non-hearsay by Rule 801(d)(2), is based on its inconsistency with the
position asserted in court. That probative value does not depend on whether the party knew
when making it that it would be against his interest in a later lawsuit. See Strahorn, A Recon-
sideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admission, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 484, 564, 570, 573 (1937),
quoted in Huff, 609 F.2d at 292.
68. Huff, 609 F.2d at 292.
69. Id.
70. Huff appears to have wanted to tell Myles and King how the accident happened, as
follows
no reason for him to invent the story of the preexisting fire in the
cab, since the story was contrary to his pecuniary interest, whether
or not he was aware of a possible claim against the manufacturer of
the vehicle. 71 The plaintiff argued that it was unlikely that Huff
made the statement because Mrs. Huff testified that he was not
physically able to carry on a conversation. 2 Thus, Mrs. Huff was
questioning the reliability of the witness. The court stated that relia-
bility of a witness' testimony that the hearsay statement was made is
not a factor in determining admissibility. 7" The circumstantial guar-
antees of trustworthiness necessary under the residual exception are
to be equivalent to the guarantees that justify the specific exceptions,
and those guarantees relate solely to the trustworthiness of the hear-
say statement itself.
74
In contrast to Huff v. White, the district court in Land v. Amer-
ican Mutual Insurance Company75 did not allow into evidence a
written unsworn statement which the decedent made to her claims
adjuster shortly after an accident in which she lost four fingers. The
court found that her statement did not provide the degree of trust-
worthiness required under Rule 803(24). To reach this determina-
Q. And was there a conversation in which [sic] you had with him and same that
he had with you? A. [by Myles] It was mostly us listening to Mr. Huff. Q. It
was mostly what? A. We listened to what he had to say.
Id. at 292 n.8.
71. Id. A fire of unexplained cause burning Huff's clothing would tend to indicate
driver error and to fix the responsibility for the accident, with attendant adverse pecuniary
consequences, on him. Id. The court also found the plaintiff's argument that Huff may have
invented the story to explain to his employer how the accident happened unpersuasive. More-
over, he was speaking to a friend and relative by marriage who were paying a sympathy call,
not to his employer. Id. at 292 n.9.
72. Id. at 292. Mrs. Huff testified that she could only see him ten minutes out of every
hour, that when she saw him "he just came and went, [slometimes he would answer, some-
times he wouldn't," didn't seem to know what was going on, couldn't speak over two or three
words at a time, and that she [Mrs. Huff] was never able to carry on a coherent conversation
with him. Id. at 292, n.10.
73. The court further declared that:
The specific exceptions to the hearsay rule are not justified by any circumstantial
guarantee that the witness who reports the statement will do so accurately and
truthfully. That witness can be cross-examined and his credibility tested in the
same way as that of any other witness. It is the hearsay declarant, not the wit-
ness who reports the hearsay, who cannot be cross-examined.
Id. at 293. Thus, the reliability test of Myles' testimony is to be applied not by the court, but
by the jury.
74. Id.
75. 582 F. Supp. 1484 (E.D. Mich. 1984). The plaintiff alleged that his decedent was
injured while operating a machine manufactured by defendant Harris Seybold Company, and
that the injury was caused by the defective design and manufacture of the machine. Land died
from causes unrelated to the hand injury. Noting that Mrs. Land was never deposed, that
there were no other witnesses to her accident, and that plaintiff would be unable to produce
any testimony or other evidence relating to the circumstances of Land's injury, the defendant
moved for a summary judgment. In response, the plaintiff produced a written unsworn state-
ment which Land made shortly after her accident, in which she described how she was injured.
The court ruled Mrs. Land's statement inadmissible, and summary judgment was granted. Id.
at 1485.
tion on admissibility, the court considered the character of the de-
clarant's statement, the relationship of the parties, the probable
motivation of the declarant in making the statement, and the cir-
cumstances under which it was made.7 6 Land, the decedent, gave her
statement 77 to the claims adjuster for her employer's worker's com-
pensation insurer during an interview to determine whether Land
was entitled to disability benefits.
The court in Land found that the circumstances and character
of Land's statement did not provide the degree of trustworthiness
required under the rule. The court noted that both the adjuster and
Land had interests which were adverse to the defendant, an un-
remarkable observation in itself, since virtually all plaintiffs have in-
terests adverse to defendants. However, it was significant here be-
cause Land and the adjuster were the only parties present when
Land gave her statement. The defendant did not have an opportunity
to observe or question Land when she made these statements. Addi-
tionally, the adjuster was the insurer's employee. The insurer would
benefit from any evidence that the machine was defective, since any
recovery Land received would first reimburse the insurer for benefits
paid or payable.
7 8
The court in Land further noted that Land's statement was
highly self-serving: she did not merely describe her actions at the
time of her injury, but also explained that her injury was caused
solely by the machine's malfunction.79 Land's statements contrasted
76. Id.
77. Land's statement read in part:
About 8:30 on 12-12-78 1 started working on the guillotine. To operate the
machine, I first have to push down a lever with my right hand to bring the blade
down and cut the material. I have only used my left hand to operate the left
handle. After I would push the right handle the blade would come down, cut the
material and then go back up and click into place locking into place. When I
heard the blade click in its up position, I reached into the machine to take the
material out of the machine. I put both of my hands under the blade to remove
the foam material. As I had both of my hands under the blade to remove the
material, the blade started coming down slower than it usually did in a normal
cycle. As I saw the blade coming down, I tried to get my hands out but I could
not get my left hand out and the blade cut off the first two joints of my little
finger and the total other three fingers. In order for me to push both levers down,
I had to reach under the table of the machine. It would be impossible to acciden-
tally bump the handles with a hip or knee because they are up under the table of
the machine. I know for sure that I did not bump the handles. When I let go of
the left handle, the only way the blade would come down again would be if the
safety catch didn't go into place. There is no way to see if the safety catches or
not because it is hidden from view because of the machine.
Id. at 1486.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1487. Land stated that she knew "for sure" that she did not bump the han-
dles which would have caused the blade to descend, because it would have been "impossible"
for her to do so. She stated that the "only way" that the blade could have descended as it did
was that the machine's safety catch had failed to operate properly. The court found that these
were statements so clearly in her own interest that their trustworthiness was subject to serious
sharply with the statements admitted in Dallas County v. Commer-
cial Union Assurance Co.,80 upon which the plaintiff relied. Unlike
Dallas, in which the newspaper report had no motive to lie, both the
adjuster and Land had reason to place all responsibility for Land's
injury upon the machine's manufacturer.8"
The plaintiff also relied upon Huff v. White to bolster its argu-
ment for admissibility of Land's statement. Land's statement did
not, however, comport with the trustworthiness standard articulated
in Huff because her statement contained both opinion and specula-
tion, was given in response to questions from one who had an interest
in the outcome of the litigation, and was not against the speaker's
interests.82
Other cases have also imposed the equivalent standard of trust-
worthiness clause of the residual hearsay exception. For example, in
United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph,83 the district
court held that "third-party" documents,8 that is, statements which
the government adopted from companies upon whose active assis-
tance it relied in presenting its case, were admissible under the
residual hearsay exception of 803(24),85 provided the statements met
doubt.
80. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
81. Land, 582 F. Supp. at 1487. Moreover, unlike Dallas County, in which the court
recognized that a false report would have subjected the newspaper and the reporter to embar-
rassment within the community, 286 F.2d at 397, Land's distortion of the truth would not
carry such possibilities.
82. Dallas County, 286 F.2d at 397. See also Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134
(5th Cir. 1982), a strict liability and negligence action against a limb loader manufacturer.
Plaintiff's son died when he was engulfed in flames while operating the limb loader. Over
plaintiff's strenuous objection, the court admitted, under Rule 803(24), plaintiff's deposition
testimony, which recalled a conversation that occurred several days after the accident while
her son was in the hospital.
83. 516 F. Supp. 1237 (D.C. 1981). In this antitrust suit brought by the government,
the defendant raised the issue of admissibility of certain so-called "third-party" documents,
that is, documents which either were authorized by employees or agents of companies in com-
petition with the defendant, or purported to recount statements made by such employees or
agents. The district court held that the documents could properly be received under the
residual exceptions to the hearsay rule, subject to defendant's compliance with procedures
designed to ensure that their admission would not unfairly disadvantage the government. How-
ever, the documents consisting of consultants' reports supplied to third parties failed to meet
the trustworthiness requirement and were thus inadmissible.
84. Id. at 1238. At the court's request, defendants submitted a sampling of these third-
party documents for consideration under Rule 803(24). The documents were organized into
seven broad categories: (I) contemporaneous memoranda reflecting discussions in meetings or
telephone conversations with or by adverse third parties (AT&T competitors); (2) internal
memoranda of adverse third parties; (3) diaries and calendars of adverse third parties; (4)
correspondence (letters from adverse third parties); (5) public statements by adverse third
parties; (6) deposition testimony in other cases; and (7) consultants' reports supplied to adverse
third parties. Id. at 1239.
85. AT&T had also proposed admitting the "third-party" documents under FED. R.
EvID. 801(d)(2) which states:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a
party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or a represen-
the equivalent standard of trustworthiness requirement. In determin-
ing the trustworthiness of the statements to be admitted, the court
proposed a two-pronged test. First, did the memoranda reliably re-
present what was said at the meeting or conversation? Second, were
the substantive statements made in the course of the meeting or con-
versation themselves trustworthy?8
To answer the first question, the court examined Rule 803(1)87
and the Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Proposed Rules.
The Committee Notes stated that the "substantial contemporaneity
of event and statement negates the likelihood of deliberate or con-
scious misrepresentation.' '86 Thus, the court concluded that the
meetings or conversations which the memoranda represented ap-
peared to be a guarantee of reliability of similar magnitude for the
purposes of Rule 803(24).89
To test the trustworthiness of substantive statements made in
the course of the meeting or conversation, the court examined Rule
tative capacity or (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adop-
tion or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by
him to make a statement concerning the subject or (D) a statement by
his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship or (E) a state-
ment by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance
of the conspiracy.
AT&T had argued that, since the government adopted and purported to believe in the
statements made by the competitor companies, these statements should be admitted as "adop-
tive admission" by the government under Rule 801(d)(2)(B). Am. Tel., 516 F. Supp. at 1238.
However, the court declared that:
[While] it is no doubt true that the government shares many common interests
with the competitors of AT&T in this suit, [tihis circumstance alone does not,
however, entail the automatic adoption by the government of every relevant doc-
ument originating in the files of these competitors. As stated by the Court of
Appeals of this Circuit:
'The Government has the same entitlement as any other party to assis-
tance from those sharing common interests, whatever their motives. This
is clearly true in antitrust cases, where Congress has established a policy
of private enforcement to supplement governmental action against offend-
ers. This policy should not be thwarted by allowing an alleged anti-trust
offender to acquire the trial preparations of his private adversaries when
they cooperate with Government lawyers in a related suit by the Justice
Department.' United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany, 642 F.2d 1285, at 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
This congressional policy would similarly be thwarted were the Court to
allow the alleged antitrust offender to introduce statements by private parties as
admissions against the government merely because these parties have cooperated
with the government lawyers in the suit.
Am. Tel., 516 F. Supp. at 1238-39.
86. Id. at 1240.
87. FED. R. EvID. 803 provides that "[tlhe following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (I) Present sense impression. A state-
ment describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving
the event or condition, or immediately thereafter."
88. FED. R. EvID. 803(1) Advisory Committee Notes, quoted in Am. Tel., 516 F.
Supp. at 1241.
89. Am Tel., 516 F. Supp. at 1241.
804(b)(3) 90 and found that although the substantive statements9l re-
corded in the contemporaneous memoranda which AT&T attempted
to introduce into evidence would probably not fall into the letter of
this exception,9 2 the theory underlying the exception was neverthe-
less instructive.93 That theory provides that the "circumstantial
guaranty of reliability for declarations against interest is the assump-
tion that persons do not make statements which are damaging to
themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they are true."
In Re A.H. Robins Co. Inc., 94 presented a novel Rule 803(24)
trustworthiness problem. In evidentiary rulings regarding depositions
on problems with intrauterine devices (IUD), several hearsay objec-
tions were premised on the hearsay-within-hearsay prohibition of
Rule 805.91 Doctors whose patients had problems with the Dalkon
Shield, or the patients themselves, had contacted and made state-
ments to Robins' employees, who had then repeated or introduced
those statements into the corporate decision-making process. 96 The
court held that the statements of the "outsiders" had a circumstan-
tial guarantee of trustworthiness since they were received and as-
sessed by Robins' employees as valuable input about the perform-
ance of the Dalkon Shield and its component parts, 97 and were
90. Federal Rule 804(b)(3) provides that statements against interest are not excluded
by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was, at the time of its
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so
far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a
claim by him against another that a reasonable man in his position would not
have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to
expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is
not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustwor-
thiness of the statement.
91. Am. Tel., 516 F. Supp. at 1240. The court found the substance of the statements
contained in the three types of documents within the memoranda category (4) all circumstan-
tially reliable under the "declaration against interest theory of the Advisory Committee." Id.
at 1241. See supra note 83 which delineates the seven categories of third-party documents at
issue.
92. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3). Advisory Committee Notes quoted in Am. Tel., 516 F.
Supp. at 1241.
93. Am. Tel., 516 F. Supp. at 1241. The court further found that the theory underlying
the memoranda's admissibility under Rule 803(24) would also apply to internal memoranda of
adverse third parties, diaries and calendars of adverse third parties, correspondence (to the
extent that the letters were authored by an employee or agent of an adverse party), and public
statements made by adverse third parties. Id.
94. 575 F. Supp. 718 (D. Kan. 1983). In consolidated discovery proceedings relating to
actions against Robins, the manufacturer of an intrauterine device (IUD), the court made
several evidentiary rulings. One ruling concerned the admission into evidence of doctors' and
IUD users' statements to Robins' employees who treated the information as valuable input
concerning the performance of the IUD and its component parts.
95. FED. R. EvID. 805 provides that "[h]earsay included within hearsay is not excluded
under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to
the hearsay rule provided in these rules."
96. 575 F. Supp. at 724.
97. Id.
produced directly from Robins' corporate files.98
The court found no reason to doubt the trustworthiness of the
doctors' and the patients' statements. Neither doctors nor patients
would be motivated to fabricate a problem or concern and then con-
tact Robins. Doctors treating patients who exhibited the same or
similar problems related to IUD use would be best able to inform the
manufacturer of these problems. Moreover, although the court failed
to recognize this, the doctors were merely communicating the infor-
mation to Robins for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treat-
ment, a hearsay exception under Rule 803(4)."9
B. Comparing 803(24) to Other Hearsay Exceptions
As illustrated by American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany, courts often examine whether the hearsay comes under any
exception other than Rule 803(24). If it does not, courts will ex-
amine whether the statement, while inadmissible under any of the
other hearsay exceptions, is admissible under Rule 803(24) because
it has the "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"
of the other hearsay exception(s). In Clark v. City of Los Angeles,100
the court refused to admit into evidence a diary kept by one of the
vendors for purposes of the litigation. The diary was not admissible
as a business record exception' 0 ' to the hearsay rule, since it was not
prepared in the regular course of a business activity, nor was it used
in the routine operation of a business or agency."0 2 Additionally, the
diary itself was replete with instances of hearsay, multiple hearsay,
and non-expert opinion which was not independently admissible. 0 8
98. Id. Similar circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness for admissibility under the
residual exceptions to the hearsay rule were present in all those categories of documents in
Am. Tel., and the documents were subsequently received into evidence. Am. Tel., 516 F. Supp.
at 1241. The sixth category, deposition testimony by employees of adverse third parties taken
in conjunction with other litigation, contains additional circumstantial guarantees of trustwor-
thiness in that it was taken under oath subject to penalties for perjury, and such depositions
will be also admitted. Am. Tel. 516 F. Supp. at 1241-42.
99. FED. R. EvID. 803(4). This hearsay exception provides that statements for purposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment are not excluded even though the declarant is available as a
witness: "(4) Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing
medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general
character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment." Id.
100. 650 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1981). Here, two open-air vendors challenged the alleged
discriminatory enforcement of permit and zoning requirements. At trial, plaintiffs asserted
that the City and its police department selectively enforced the law, denied due process, and
conspired to deny them their Civil Rights in violation of 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1985(3). From
a judgment of $60,000, the defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals found the diary inad-
missible either as a business record, since it was not used in the business of selling new and
used merchandise, or under the hearsay exception for statements which have equivalent cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.
101. FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
102. Clark, 650 F.2d at 1037.
103. Id.
The diary was also inadmissible under 803(24) because it did
not have circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to
the enumerated exceptions.10 4 Moreover, the diary was a heavily
"emotive" document which did not simply relate factual occurrences,
but was written in a style designed to arouse sympathy and create
enmity for the defendants. 10 5
U.S. v. Hitsman 06 illustrates an interesting application of Rule
803(24). There, the court utilized the traditional equivalent circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness standard for an untraditional
reason. In Hitsman, the government introduced one defendant's col-
lege transcript to show that an individual who had taken those
courses could manufacture methamphetamine. 10 7 The court admitted
the transcript under Rule 803(24)18 and found it to be a self-au-
thenticating document 0 9 under Rules 9011"0 and 902.1"
Although the issue of trustworthiness was not specifically ad-
dressed in Hitsman, the college transcript did meet the equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness standard. There was no
reason to assume the transcript was in error about the courses taken,
nor was there motivation to falsify the transcript. In fact, falsifica-
tion would have served no one's purpose, since the transcript was
104. Id. at 1038.
105. Id. "The diary went far beyond the other evidence properly brought forth in this
case, in that it contained much hearsay and opinion statements, and was written in a highly
emotional and sympathetic manner." Id.
106. 604 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1979). Defendants were convicted under 18 USC § 2 and
21 USC §§ 812, 841(a)(1) and 846, of conspiracy to manufacture and distribute
methamphetamine, and distribution and manufacture of methamphetamine. Id. at 444. On
appeal, one defendant challenged the government's admission of his college transcript under
803(24) for the purposes of showing that an individual who had taken the course shown [on
the transcript] could manufacture methamphetamine. Id. at 446.
107. Hitsman, 604 F.2d at 446. An expert witness for the government, who had ex-
amined invoices for the various chemicals and equipment, and testified that they were used to
manufacture methamphetamine, reviewed the college transcript.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 447. The court judicially noticed the college's existence, finding that colleges
normally make such records in the course of operations and that the exhibit had the indicia of
being an authentic copy since it bore a seal above the registrar's signature. Id.
110. FED. R. EvID. 901(a) provides that "[tihe requirement of authentication or identifi-
cation as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."
I ll. FED. R. EvID. 902. Rule 902 provides:
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility
is not required with respect to the following:
(I) Domestic public documents under seal.
(2) Domestic public documents not under seal.
(3) Foreign public documents.
(4) Certified copies of public records.
(5) Official publications.
(6) Newspapers and periodicals.
(7) Trade inscriptions and the like.
(8) Acknowledged documents.
(9) Commercial paper and related documents.
(10) Presumptions under Acts of Congress.
prepared as the student matriculated through school. Moreover, a
student normally sees his transcript at the time he is matriculating
and has an opportunity to note any errors, thus satisfying the old
concept of publicity. The transcript, admitted under 803(24) seemed
to have the equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
found in Rules 803(6) and 803(8).
In J.D. Moffett v. McCauley,12 a prison inmate unsuccessfully
brought a civil rights action alleging that a strip-search method was
unconstitutional. The court held that it was error to refuse to admit
a prison report detailing the search. 13 Since the report was prepared
on behalf of the defendants, the court found it reasonable to infer
that the investigators preparing the report relied on prison officials
with first-hand knowledge of the incident for information."" Addi-
tionally, the prison official responsible for the report had both a busi-
ness duty and a public obligation to be accurate."15 The court also
noted that the warden's willingness to sign an affidavit attached to
the report saying that its contents were true to the best of his knowl-
edge attests to the warden's confidence in the mode of preparation." 6
The decision to admit this report is troublesome for several rea-
sons. First, while the court examined the report, it did not examine
its contents. The report relied on prison officials who had "first-hand
knowledge" of the incident. How trustworthy can these statements
be or, more correctly, how objective can those involved in the inci-
dent be? Second, courts routinely refuse to admit reports made in
preparation for litigation, holding that they lack sufficient guarantees
of trustworthiness because they are not made in the regular course of
business."' The Moffett court rationalized the report's admission be-
cause the evidence was offered against the party for whom it was
prepared." 8 But this reasoning fails to support a finding that the
112. 724 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1984). The strip search in question took place in the confer-
ence room of the main administration building at the correctional facility. Moffett was ordered
to take off all of his clothes and to bend over and spread his buttocks. Plaintiff complained
about offensive language made by the guards. As the defendant's brief described the unlikely
and unfortunate set of circumstances, after the strip search but before Moffett was fully
clothed, "two nuns of all things" appeared at the door. Moffett asserted that the nuns saw him
completely nude, and that one of the guards laughed degradingly.
After Moffett filed a complaint regarding the strip search, prison officials conducted an
investigation. Moffett sought to have the report admitted into evidence because it conflicted
with the [guard's] trial testimony. Id. at 583.
113. Id. at 582.
114. Id. at 584.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. See, e.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) (deceased railroad engi-
neer's signed statement giving his version of grade-crossing accident involving locomotive he
was operating, made two days after the accident during interview with company official and
state commission representative held inadmissible because not made "in the regular course" of
business within meaning of the Business Records Act).
118. Moffett, 724 F.2d at 584, n.I. See also Leon v. Penn Central Co., 428 F.2d 528,
report met the trustworthiness standard set forth in 803(24). It is
not inconceivable that the "facts" given by representatives of the
party involved were colored by their subjective viewpoint.
C. Failure to Meet the 803(24) Trustworthiness Standard
A number of cases illustrate evidence which does not rise to the
level of trustworthiness required for admission. For example, in
United States v. Castandeda-Reyes,119 an air piracy case, the court
excluded a document from the Cuban Ministry of Public Health
which purportedly showed the defendant's stay as a patient in a psy-
chiatric hospital because the document had apparently been al-
tered.120 In addition to excluding altered documents, courts fre-
quently exclude self-serving statements as untrustworthy, even when
such statements actually go against the declarant's interests. In
United States v. Hinkson,'21 in which Hinkson was convicted of
homicide in a motorcycle gang murder, a third-party witness testi-
fied that another gang member committed the murder for which
Hinkson had been convicted. But the evidence against Hinkson was
so overwhelming that the alleged admission to a third-party witness
was probably sheer bravado.122 The appeals court held that there
was an insufficient basis to demonstrate equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness, even though the gang member's third-
party statements were self-inculpatory.
2 3
As previously mentioned, Rule 803(24) calls for a guarantee of
trustworthiness equivalent to that of the other twenty-three hearsay
530 (7th Cir. 1970).
119. 703 F.2d 522 (11 th Cir. 1983). Appellant Rafael Castaneda-Reyes was convicted
of attempted air piracy under 49 USC § 1472(i)(1). On October 25, 1980, appellant was on a
commercial flight leaving Miami en route to San Antonio. Shortly after take-off, Castaneda-
Reyes attempted to hijack the plane to Cuba, but was quickly subdued. Once restrained, he
began hitting his head against the bulkhead several times, stating he was crazy. Castaneda-
Reyes asserted a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.
120. Id. at 524.
121. 632 F.2d 382 (4th Cir. 1980). Hinkson, a member of the "Norseman" motorcycle
gang, was convicted of killing a guard at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. At trial, the defense
interrogated Minott, another gang member, who left the state on the day of the murder, and
eventually turned up in New Hampshire, living with Jack and Teresa Neal, friends of his
girlfriend. While Minott admitted that he carried with him clippings of several shootings, in-
cluding that of the guard's murder, he denied that he had spoken of unfinished business in
North Carolina. In response to Minott's denials, the defense attempted to call Teresa Neal.
Outside the jury's presence, Neal testified that Minott had said he shot the guard with the aid
of someone called "Wolf," and that he (Minott) was wanted for murder. According to Neal,
Minott showed her clippings of North Carolina shootings on one occasion. Id. at 384.
122. The only guarantee of trustworthiness was the fact that Minott's alleged statement
was self-inculpatory. Hinkson, 632 F.2d at 386. However, Neal testified that Minott gloried in
parading his motorcycle gang member image before his girlfriend's acquaintances. A claim
that he killed the guard, made to a relatively casual acquaintance hundreds of miles from the
scene of the killing, would seem to be braggadocio. Id.
123. See supra note 121.
exceptions. In United States v. Perlmutter,124  the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a document purportedly listing the defen-
dant's four convictions in Israel was inadmissible under either Rule
803(8) or Rule 803(24). The court disallowed the document under
803(8) because there was no evidence of any duty on the part of the
person signing the report--or anyone else-to record the informa-
tion.125 The court also refused to admit the document under 803(24),
holding that there was nothing indicating that the exhibit, when
compared with other hearsay exceptions, had the equivalent circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness.' 2 In the court's view, 803(24)
could not be used to circumvent either the "duty to record" require-
ments of 803(6) or 803(8), or the requirements of 803(22).127
D. Misinterpreting the 803(24) Trustworthiness Standard
Some courts have attempted to employ 803(24) to transcend
traditional trustworthiness analysis, based on circumstances existing
at the time the statement is made, by measuring trustworthiness on
the basis of whether independent extrinsic corroboration of the out-
124. 693 F.2d 1290 (9th Cir. 1982). Yitchak Perlmutter was convicted of misstating
orally and on his Application to File Petition for Naturalization that he had not been convicted
of any offense other than traffic violations. Id. at 1292. At his trial, a document purporting to
list Perlmutter's four convictions in Israel was entered as an exhibit. The court of appeals held
that the document was not properly authenticated, and should have been excluded from evi-
dence as hearsay not falling within any recognized exceptions.
125. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
126. Perlmutter, 693 F.2d at 1293. The court also declared that:
[Since] there is no indication that Herstig, the person who signed the conviction
report and the identification form, had first hand knowledge of the convictions
and because of the probability of multiple levels of hearsay in this situation, [the
evidence] does not fit within Rule 803(8). It is apparent that Herstig, who
signed the conviction report, did not act on the basis of first hand knowledge
since the alleged convictions had occurred from 17 to 26 years earlier in a vari-
ety of different courts.
Id. at 1293-94. This interpretation of Rule 803(8) is erroneous. An individual need not have
first-hand knowledge of the incidents or facts contained in the records he controls or super-
vises. Such a requirement would be an impossible and impractical one. Rule 803(8) attempts
to avoid this hardship, and focuses on necessity and convenience. See Grant, The Trustworthi-
ness Standard For The Public Records and Reports Hearsay Exception, 12 WESTERN STATE
U. L. REV. (Fall 1984).
127. FED. R. EvID. 803(22) provides that, even if the declarant is available as a witness,
the hearsay rule will not exclude:
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered af-
ter a trial or upon plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contend(ere),
adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or improvement in
excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not
including, when offered by the Government in a criminal prosecution for pur-
poses other than impeachments, judgment against persons other than the ac-
cused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect
admissibility.
Rule 803(22) was intended to be a vehicle for proving underlying facts when a judgment
of conviction is presented. Perlmutter, 693 F.2d at 1294. In Perlmutter, the district court
attempted to stretch the rule to allow the fact of conviction to be proved by lesser evidence. A
judgment of conviction, not the conviction itself, is a prerequisite to the use of this rule. Id.
of-court statement existed. This independent extrinsic corroboration
may include the availability at trial of the out-of-court declarant
128
or corroboration of the hearsay at trial by other admissible evidence.
In United States v. Thevis, 2 9 a RICO case in which the out-of-
court declarant was murdered before trial but after giving his grand
jury testimony, the court admitted the testimony at trial. 30 The
court established a two part analysis in determining whether a state-
128. Compare FED. R. EvID. 804(a) which defines unavailability as follows:
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situa-
tions in which the declarant -
(I) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege
from testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his
statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his state-
ment; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of
death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement
has been unable to procure his attendance (or, in the case of a hearsay
exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), his attendance or testi-
mony) by process or other reasonable means. A declarant is not unavaila-
ble as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inabil-
ity, or absence is due to the procurement or wrong doing of the proponent
of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending
or testifying.
129. 84 F.R.D. 57 (N.D. Ga. 1979), affd on other grounds, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 1008 (1982). Thevis was charged and convicted of violating the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The court admitted statements
and grand jury testimony of Underhill, a witness who was murdered, by the defendant, prior to
trial. The court relied on FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5) to admit the testimony: "Death had been
the most obvious and irreversible form of unavailability." Thevis, 84 F.R.D. at 64 n.3, quoting
WEINSTEIN supra note 35 at 804-39 (1978). Since both FED. R. EvID. 803(24) and FED. R.
EVID. 804(b)(5) have the same equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness stan-
dard and since this case involves the issue of corroboration, its use is pertinent in the
discussion.
130. Prior to offering the statement under Rule 804(b)(5), the court recessed the trial
for hearings outside the presence of the jury. During these hearings, the defense presented
evidence as to Underhill's credibility, motive, interest, and bias, as well as evidence directed
towards controverting the corroborating evidence upon which the government relied to reach
the "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" required by Rule 804(b)(5). Rule
804(b)(5) provides that, notwithstanding the declarant's unavailability, the hearsay rule will
not exclude:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court de-
termines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C)
the general purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served
by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the ad-
verse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer
the statement and the particulars of it including the name and address of the
declarant.
For a more complete discussion on the admissibility of grand jury testimony and confron-
tation rights, see Comment, The Admissibility of Grand Jury Testimony Under 804(b)(5): A
Test Proposal, 74 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 1446 (1983).
ment has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.131 The first
step takes the more traditional view, analyzing the declarant and the
circumstances surrounding his statement. This portion of the analy-
sis inquires into the declarant's relationship with the party against
whom the statement is offered, the declarant's motive to speak truth-
fully about the facts observed, the nature in which the declarant
gave the statement, and the declarant's opportunity to observe the
episode set forth in the statement.
13 2
The second, and more novel part of the court's analysis, is to
determine whether there is independent evidence to corroborate the
statement.1 83 In effect, this part of the analysis looks outside the
statement to determine circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,
while the first inquiry seeks to satisfy the same benchmark from
within the statement.
1 3 4
United States v. West' 3 5 adopts the same position on corrobora-
tion. There, the trial court admitted into evidence the grand jury
testimony of a witness who was slain before trial. The defendants
appealed the trial court's application of 804(b)(5), contending that
the deceased witness' prior criminal record contradicted Rule
804(b)(5)'s legislative history. Defendants argued that 804(b)(5) ap-
plied only when "exceptional circumstances" lent a degree of trust-
worthiness equivalent to that of evidence admissible under other
131. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. at 63.
132. Id. The court found that Underhill had a strong motive to testify truthfully, since
only untruthful testimony would have subjected him to criminal liability. Additionally, at the
time of the grand jury testimony and the F.B.I. interview, he had a civil RICO suit pending
against defendant Thevis. The pending civil litigation gave Underhill further motive to testify
truthfully, since prior inconsistent statements could be used to impeach his credibility and
harm his civil RICO testimony.
The fact that the statements were recorded and accurately transcribed supports their
credibility. Additionally, the statements bespeak their own authenticity as each is replete with
detail to which only a participant and confidant would have access. Furthermore, the court
noted that no agreement had been made by the government to shield Underhill from civil
liability for his past actions. Consequently, many of the statements contained admissions
against Underhill's pecuniary interest. Id. at 65.
133. Id. at 64.
134. Id. For the second part of the test, the court reviewed each proffer individually to
determine whether the corroborating evidence enhanced the circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness. Id. at 66. The additional evidence did support the government's case and the testi-
mony given by Underhill. However, this raises the basic question of whether there was a need
for corroboration to admit Underhill's statements. The government might have had additional
supportive or corroborative evidence or testimony with which to bolster its case. No trial attor-
ney wishes to rely on one witness for the entire case, particularly if the witness is deceased.
But each piece of evidence, while it may be supportive of other pieces of evidence, should not
be used to bolster the admission of other exhibits and testimony.
135. 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978). The defendants were tried and convicted of distri-
bution of and possession with intent to distribute, heroin. The issue on appeal was whether the
admission of the grand jury testimony of Michael Victor Brown, who was slain before trial,
was proper under Rule 804(b)(5) and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
Thus, the issues in this case closely parallel those found in Thevis. The convictions were the
result of an extensive Drug Enforcement Agency investigation in which Brown, while serving
time on drug and parole violations, volunteered his assistance to the DEA. Id. at 1131.
804(b) exceptions to the extra-judicial statement."'6
The court in West noted that the government took elaborate
steps which not only met, but probably "exceeded by far," the sub-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness of some of the other 804(b)
hearsay exceptions.13 7 For example, the agents made certain that
Brown, the deceased witness, possessed neither drugs nor money
other than that supplied by the agents to make the purchases 8 nec-
essary for the arrest. The court also found that other precautions,
including the use of electronic surveillance devices, assured the relia-
bility of the actual out-of-court statement.139 For the court, "the
most impressive assurance of trustworthiness," '1 0 came from the cor-
roboration provided by the agents' observations, from pictures they
took, and recordings of the conversations.""
It is not troubling that Brown's statements were corroborated,
but rather that the corroboration was used as a basis for satisfying
the equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness as a requisite to admis-
sibility. The court in West found that the guarantees here were
greater than necessary. This may be correct. Nevertheless, the court
confuses not only what standards should be applied to meet the
"equivalency" test for trustworthiness, that is, whether corroboration
should be a factor in determining trustworthiness, but also, in utiliz-
ing the Thevis court's two-level approach, what standards come
under which category. For example, the court categorizes as "cor-
roboration" Brown's interest in gaining favors in order to avoid fur-
ther imprisonment, which in turn gave him strong incentive to be
extremely accurate in reporting. 42 This is not corrobative evidence;
it is Wigmore's trustworthiness standard for determining when hear-
136. Id. at 1134-35.
137. Id. at 1135.
138. Each time the DEA agents received notice that Brown was about to make a
purchase, they arranged for extensive surveillance. Id. at 1133. Before each purchase, DEA
agents strip-searched Brown to determine whether he had drugs or money other than the
money supplied by the agents to effect the purchase. Id. at 1133, 1135. The agents also
searched his vehicle to be sure that it did not contain any drugs. Id. at 1133.
139. Except when he entered a building, thus becoming concealed from view, Brown was
under constant surveillance, photographs were taken when he was with one of the defendants.
Id. at 1135. After each purchase, Brown and an agent reviewed what he had done, said, and
observed, and then prepared a correct statement. Id.
140. Id. at 1135.
141. Id. The court declared that:
Although Brown's grand jury testimony was not subject to immediate cross-ex-
amination, to a large extent what Brown said was corroborated by the observa-
tions of the agents. The agents did appear as witnesses and were subject to cross-
examinations about what they observed, including the possibility of mistake or
prevarication by Brown, and their own roles in preparing Brown's statement.
Id.
142. Id. Brown knew what the agents were doing to corroborate and verify his reports,
and any attempted deception would only have aroused their suspicion.
say may be admitted into evidence.' 43
In United States v. Bailey,' one defendant gave a signed state-
ment to the F.B.I., but then refused to testify at trial. The court of
appeals reversed the conviction, finding that the trustworthiness of a
statement should be analyzed by evaluating not only the facts cor-
roborating the statement's veracity, but also the circumstances in
which the declarant made the statement and his incentive to speak
truthfully or falsely. The court also declared that factors bearing on
the reliability of the report of the hearsay should be considered. 45
The tests applied in Bailey were incorrect for several reasons.
First, the in-court witness reporting the out-of-court statement does
not have a bearing on whether the out-of-court statement is trust-
worthy. The trustworthiness of the hearsay is distinct from the trust-
worthiness of the witness on the stand. The fact-finder is capable of
deciding whether the witness is credible through his demeanor,
through impeachment, or through the testimony itself. In Huff v.
White, 46 the court rejected Bailey, noting that the specific excep-
tions to the hearsay rule are not justified by any circumstantial guar-
antee that the witness who reports the statement will do so accu-
rately and truthfully. 47 It is the hearsay declarant, not the witness
who reports the hearsay, who cannot be cross-examined.
Second, the court in Bailey misapprehended the equivalent cir-
cumstantial guarantees for trustworthiness, because it emphasized
corroboration, a misunderstanding also apparent in West, Thevis,
and Brown. As in these cases, in which the courts employed corrobo-
ration in determining whether a hearsay statement met the
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, the court in
143. See also United States v. McCall, 740 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1984), in which the
court held that the trial court erred in admitting the affidavit of an unavailable witness. While
the court supported the "corroborative testim6ny" view-point of trustworthiness discussed in
United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978) and
West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978), the court found that an affidavit did not rise to the
"indicia of reliability" required for admission, as compared to the admissions of grand jury
testimony in other cases.
144. 581 F.2d 341 (3rd Cir. 1978). Bailey's robbery accomplice, Stewart, agreed to
plead guilty under terms requiring Stewart to furnish a statement and to testify at any future
proceedings concerning the robbery. Prior to sentencing, Stewart gave the F.B.I. two oral
statements, one of which was transcribed by an F.B.I. agent. Stewart signed that statement,
acknowledging its truth. Both statements outlined Stewart's involvement in the robbery and
named Bailey as the second bank robber. During Bailey's trial, Stewart refused to testify con-
cerning his earlier statements. The court ruled that Stewart's written statements were admissi-
ble pursuant to Rule 804(b)(5), since the F.B.I. agent who was present when Stewart made his
statement testified about its contents and the manner in which the statement was taken. Id. at
343-45.
145. Id. at 349.
146. 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979).
147. 609 F.2d at 293. As the court recognizes, the witness [repeating the hearsay state-
ment] can be cross-examined and his credibility tested in the same way as that of any other
witness. Id.
Bailey similarly confused admission of corroborative evidence to sup-
port a position taken at trial, with corroborative evidence to support
the admission at trial of hearsay evidence.
IV. Conclusion
Some courts have utilized the equivalent circumstantial guaran-
tee of trustworthiness standard properly by applying Wigmore's ap-
proach to determine trustworthiness. Other courts, in attempting to
adapt this rule for novel purposes have used the wrong standard, and
have either improperly applied the rule or applied it for the wrong
reason. A few courts have completely confused the concept of
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness by misapply-
ing or misunderstanding the policy of admitting hearsay evidence if
and when it is trustworthy.
These problems can be remedied only if courts articulate when
hearsay is trustworthy and admissible under the standards provided
by Wigmore and Weinstein, and as illustrated in Dallas County.
14 8
Inserting the word "independent" before the word "equivalent" in
Rule 803(24) to signify that the statement to be admitted should be
considered "trustworthy" independently from "corroborative" evi-
dence would further clarify the Rule's proper application. Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(24) will reach its full potential as a purveyor
of truth only when it is used as Congress intended.
148. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.

